Michigan Law Review
Volume 121

Issue 2

2022

The Particle Problem: Using RCRA Citizen Suits to Fill Gaps in the
Clean Air Act
Kurt Wohlers
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, and the Law and Race
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kurt Wohlers, The Particle Problem: Using RCRA Citizen Suits to Fill Gaps in the Clean Air Act, 121 MICH.
L. REV. 325 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol121/iss2/5

https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.3.algorithmic
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTE

THE PARTICLE PROBLEM: USING RCRA CITIZEN SUITS TO
FILL GAPS IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Kurt Wohlers*
While the Clean Air Act has done a substantial amount for the environment
and the health of individuals in the United States, there is still much to be done.
For all its complexity, the Act has perpetuated systemic inequities and allowed
harms to fall more heavily on low-income communities and communities of
color. This is no less true for particulate matter pollution, which is becoming
worse by the year and is a significant cause of illness and premature death.
This Note argues that particulate pollution, traditionally only regulated on the
federal level within the ambit of the Clean Air Act, can be addressed through
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s citizen suit provision. Such an
approach has largely gone untested in the federal courts; however, there are
strong arguments in favor of applying the citizen suit provision to particulate
matter. This Note also advocates for a simple legislative change that could allow those most harmed by air emissions to seek redress. If adopted, this proposal would supplement the intricate regulatory framework of the Clean Air
Act with a way for communities, particularly communities of color and poor
communities, to seek relief when pollution slips through the cracks.
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INTRODUCTION
The complex regulatory framework of the Clean Air Act (CAA) has failed
communities by allowing harmful pollutants to seep through the cracks of the
law. This Note suggests a novel solution to some of those gaps: using the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) imminent and substantial
endangerment suit provision to prevent and remedy harms caused by air
emissions. Part I discusses the current harms of air pollution and the unique
impact of those harms on marginalized groups. Part II considers gaps in the
CAA, using two examples as case studies. Part III introduces the RCRA citizen
suit provision and considers how courts have treated this provision in the context of solid waste disposals in water and air. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to fill gaps in the CAA through RCRA citizen suits. The RCRA citizen
suit provision currently allows litigants to bring claims involving particulate
matter, except where defendants are protected by Title V permit shields or
where the suit concerns gaseous waste. In such cases, addressing these harms
will likely require changes to the statutory language. This proposal engages
with a precautionary principle—asking how little harm is possible rather than
how much harm is allowable. It also equips communities with a tool to fight
harms when and where they occur, rather than requiring reliance on a complex regulatory framework that often fails to protect those most affected by
unbreathable and unlivable air conditions.
I.

THE HARMS OF AIR POLLUTION

While air quality regulation has brought some good, there is still much to
be done. To understand where the CAA has gone wrong, it is necessary to
discuss how particulate matter pollution impacts the lives of millions of people, including predominantly those in marginalized communities.
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A. The Current State of Air Pollution
Particulate matter is “a mixture of solid particles and liquid droplets
found in the air.”1 It often consists of dust, soot, organic compounds, and metals. 2 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) divides particulate matter into two categories: PM10, which is generally ten micrometers
or smaller, and PM2.5, which is generally two and a half micrometers or
smaller. 3 The EPA did not have a regulatory standard for PM2.5 until 1997, and
the effects of inhaling particulate matter are still not fully understood. 4 What
is known is this: fine particles can enter the bloodstream, harm the respiratory
system, and accumulate in the brain. 5 Particle pollution has been linked to
dementia, cognitive decline, increased infant mortality, cardiovascular disease, childhood asthma, cancer, and nervous system harm, among other issues. 6 These harms are acute in metropolitan areas like Detroit, where
environmental racism is pervasive, and every year 2,500 children have asthma
attacks related to air pollution. 7 Lowering particle pollution by as little as 1
µg/m3 (one microgram per cubic meter) could prevent approximately 34,000
premature deaths every year in the United States. 8 Unfortunately, we are
headed in the wrong direction. From 2016 to 2019, PM2.5 concentration levels
rose by 5.5 percent. 9
Wildfires, which have been on the rise in recent years, account for some
of the increase in particle pollution in the United States. 10 Currently, wildfires
account for up to 25 percent of pollution from fine particles. 11 Recent public

1. Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulatematter-pm-basics [perma.cc/JR4R-WNMU] (last updated July 18, 2022).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Christopher Ingraham, Air Pollution Is Getting Worse, and Data Show More People
Are Dying, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/23/air-pollution-is-getting-worse-data-show-more-people-are-dying [perma.cc/
5THS-GN7M].
5. Id.
6. Id.; Particle Pollution, AM. LUNG ASS’N, https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/whatmakes-air-unhealthy/particle-pollution [perma.cc/6NUF-BDSG] (last updated Apr. 20, 2020).
7. Steve Neavling, Struggling to Breathe in 48217, Michigan’s Most Toxic ZIP Code,
DETROIT METRO TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/struggling-to-breathe-in-48217-michigans-most-toxic-zip-code/Content?oid=23542211 [perma.cc/
9UH2-8D6L].
8. Particle Pollution, supra note 6.
9. Ingraham, supra note 4.
10. Ingraham, supra note 4. While this Note does not assert a solution to the problem of
wildfires, it is relevant to mention that they are on the rise, as increasing wildfires will make it all
the more necessary to reduce particle pollution from human sources.
11. Tony Barboza, Wildfire Smoke Now Causes Up to Half the Fine-Particle Pollution in
Western U.S., Study Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-01-13/wildfire-smoke-fine-particle-pollution-western-us-study [perma.cc/8B44QFGV].
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health studies have found that in areas near major wildfires, there was a 10
percent increase in hospital admissions 12 and an 11.7 percent increase in
COVID-19 cases. 13 And barring a dramatic increase in efforts to abate greenhouse gas emissions and slow climate change, wildfires will only become more
pervasive, intensifying the impacts of particle pollution.
B. Environmental Justice and Impact on Marginalized Groups
The ability to breathe depends on where a person lives. According to a
recent study, “a child born in Los Angeles County in 2016 was exposed to 42%
more fine particle pollution than the average child born in the United
States.” 14 And as Dr. Mustafa Santiago Ali, a founding member of the EPA
Office of Environmental Justice, has remarked: “More people die [prematurely] every year in our country from air pollution than died from the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Vietnam, and the Korean War combined.” 15 These
harms are significant, and there is no question that the harms of air particle
pollution have not fallen evenly across all groups. The areas most impacted by
fine particle pollution in 1981 are still the areas most impacted today, and the
areas least impacted—generally whiter and richer—are still the least impacted
today. 16 Black Americans are exposed to 21 percent more fine particle pollution than the national average, whereas white Americans were exposed to
amounts 8 percent below the national average. 17 Exposure to fine particulate
matter from diesel trucks, construction work, and other industry sources depends on race. 18 In 1987, the United Church of Christ (UCC) issued a groundbreaking report finding widespread environmental racism in determining

12. Nathan Rott, Study Finds Wildfire Smoke More Harmful to Humans than Pollution
from Cars, NPR (Mar. 5, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/
03/05/973848360/study-finds-wildfire-smoke-more-harmful-to-humans-than-pollution-fromcars [perma.cc/23VT-RFWA] (using data from Southern California).
13. Press Release, Wildfire Smoke May Have Contributed to Thousands of Extra COVID19 Cases and Deaths in Western U.S. in 2020, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Aug.
20, 2021), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/wildfire-smoke-may-have-contributed-to-thousands-of-extra-covid-19-cases-and-deaths-in-western-u-s-in-2020 [perma.cc/
7UKX-4PCB] (using data from California, Oregon, and Washington).
14. Jonathan Colmer & Jay Shimshack, Air Pollution Down in the U.S. but Still Hurts
Marginalized Communities Most, PBS (Aug. 3, 2020, 5:57 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/air-pollution-down-in-the-u-s-but-still-hurts-marginalized-communities-most
[perma.cc/LR47-G2R4].
15. Mustafa Santiago Ali, Keynote Speech: Raven Lecture on Access to Justice, 46 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 921, 925 (2019).
16. Colmer & Shimshack, supra note 14.
17. Zack Budryk, Fine-Particle Pollution Disproportionately Hurts People of Color: Research,
HILL (Apr. 28, 2021, 3:13 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/550762-fine-particle-pollution-disproportionately-hurts-people-of-color [perma.cc/EC8L-PW8N].
18. Id.
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sites for toxic waste facilities. 19 This report, along with other evidence, played
a foundational role in the creation of the environmental justice movement. 20
When the UCC reviewed their data twenty years later, they found that race
still played a predominant role in understanding where toxic wastes were
sited. 21
This also remains true for air pollution. Racial residential segregation
through zoning policies, property laws, and credit rationing has allowed air
pollution facilities more access to neighborhoods where marginalized groups
live. 22 As of 2017, more than one million Black individuals live within a half
mile of an oil and gas facility. 23 Many of the pollutants emitted from these
facilities, such as methane and benzene, 24 will not be adequately covered by a
solution that only applies to particulate matter. 25 Therefore, to address widespread environmental racism as it relates to air pollution, a proposal that contemplates gas emissions must be considered.
The 2007 UCC Report suggests that environmental justice should emphasize a precautionary principle: instead of focusing on how much harm is allowable, the law should consider how little harm is possible. 26 This
precautionary principle of harm elimination plays a guiding role in shaping
this Note’s solution. Rather than set maximum limits and permit some
amount of pollution to go unchecked, this Note suggests a solution that seeks
to stop harm whenever and wherever it occurs.
II.

GAPS IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Unlike the Clean Water Act (CWA), which begins with the presumption
that a discharge from a point source requires a permit, the CAA’s regulatory

19. COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN
UNITED STATES (1987), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1310/ML13109A339.pdf [perma.cc/
E7E4-TP4K].
20. Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, NRDC (Mar. 17,
2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-justice-movement [perma.cc/2FRD-5WHF].
21. ROBERT D. BULLARD, PAUL MOHAI, ROBIN SAHA & BEVERLY WRIGHT, UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY 1987–2007 (2007), https://
www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/toxic-wastes-and-race-at-twenty-1987-2007.pdf [perma.cc/
R7UN-UEDQ].
22. Bongki Woo et al., Residential Segregation and Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Ambient
Air Pollution, 11 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 60, 60–61 (2019). Government response to air quality concerns can also vary substantially based on race. See Aneesh Patnaik, Jiahn Son, Alice Feng &
Crystal Ade, Racial Disparities and Climate Change, PRINCETON STUDENT CLIMATE
INITIATIVE (Aug. 15, 2020), https://psci.princeton.edu/tips/2020/8/15/racial-disparities-andclimate-change [perma.cc/E3B7-Q4QS].
23. LESLEY FLEISCHMAN & MARCUS FRANKLIN, NAACP & CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, FUMES
ACROSS THE FENCE-LINE 11 (2017), https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/21092330/
catf-rpt-naacp-4.21.pdf [perma.cc/5RQH-79KC].
24. Id. at 12.
25. For further discussion on the particulate and gas distinction, see infra Section III.C.
26. BULLARD ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
THE
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framework varies from state to state and pollutant to pollutant. 27 This complex framework creates a series of small gaps that together form giant holes,
as discussed in Section II.A. And even when permits are required, they still
enable harms. A solution that seeks to limit harm needs to consider the power
of the permit shield, as illustrated in Section II.B.
A. Unregulated Pollution from Stationary Sources
While the CAA defines “air pollutant” broadly, 28 the reach of regulation
permitted by statute is not nearly as broad. A list of what is not regulated, or
underregulated, includes: pollutants not specified in the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 29 or Hazardous Air Pollutant Standards, 30
nonmajor stationary sources, 31 sources in attainment areas, 32 existing
sources, 33 and indirect sources. 34
For an easy example of the CAA’s regulatory gaps, consider the Act’s designation of attainment areas. Generally, the EPA looks at certain “criteria air
pollutants” and determines if geographic areas meet the national standards for
those pollutants. If they do not, they are designated as “nonattainment” areas
subject to additional regulation to get them back on track. 35 But this structure
ignores “hotspots,” such as neighborhoods near an airport or oil refinery. 36
Consequently, while some broad areas may be labeled “in attainment,” this

27. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (requiring states to submit their implementation
plans to achieve air quality standards), and 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (designating only certain pollutants as “hazardous air pollutants.”).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
29. See NAAQS Table, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table
[perma.cc/HFC7-34AP] (last updated Apr. 5, 2022) (listing carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particle pollution, and sulfur dioxide as “ ‘criteria’ air pollutants” regulated under
NAAQS).
30. See What Are Hazardous Air Pollutants?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/haps/what-arehazardous-air-pollutants [perma.cc/74FY-57JW] (last updated Jan. 5, 2022).
31. See Regulatory and Guidance Information by Topic: Air, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/regulatory-information-topic/regulatory-and-guidance-information-topic-air [perma.cc/AF9DLNN8] (last updated June 21, 2022).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (listing requirements for areas only in nonattainment).
33. See West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2601 (2022) (noting that once EPA sets new
source standards for a particular pollutant, it must then address emissions from existing sources
of the same pollutant only in certain circumstances).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i) (“Any State may include in a State implementation
plan, but the Administrator may not require as a condition of approval of such plan under this
section, any indirect source review program.”).
35. NAAQS Designations Process, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqsdesignations-process [perma.cc/2NUZ-LGLG] (last updated Nov. 26, 2021).
36. Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution,
65 UCLA L. REV. 1036, 1041 (2018).
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may not describe the reality for much of the population living there, particularly for those who live next to an existing stationary source that is almost entirely unregulated. 37
Satellite data suggests that the EPA has frequently misclassified areas as
“in attainment” for particulate matter in cities such as Chicago, San Diego,
Houston, St. Louis, and Cincinnati. 38 This indicates that 24.4 million people
live in areas wrongly designated as “in attainment” for PM2.5. 39 Moreover, because only 21 percent of counties in the United States have PM2.5 monitors,
many “hotspots” of particle pollution may appear to be “in attainment” even
though they are not. 40 If the EPA properly classified these areas, the number
of people living in nonattainment areas would more than double, 41 potentially
avoiding 2,726 premature deaths per year. 42 ProPublica has also done critical
research in this area, finding thousands of toxic hotspots across the United
States, which create cancer risks that the EPA itself deems unacceptable. 43 The
EPA’s misclassification of attainment areas is just one example of how gaps in
the CAA independently cause harm.
For a more complicated example of how the CAA’s gaps overlap to cause
harm, consider the following case study. Under the CAA, states are permitted
to regulate indirect sources 44 but are prohibited from regulating new locomotives. 45 The EPA, conversely, may regulate new locomotives, 46 but the EPA
may not regulate indirect sources. 47 Given that the EPA standards for new locomotives only began to phase in during 2011, and locomotives have a replacement cycle of thirty to forty years, 48 old locomotives in railyards will
37. Id. at 1048, 1077–78.
38. Daniel M. Sullivan & Alan Krupnick, Using Satellite Data to Fill the Gaps in the US Air
Pollution Monitoring Network 2, 32 (Res. for the Future, Working Paper No. 18-21, 2018),
https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF20WP-18-21_0.pdf [perma.cc/F94D-D29C].
39. Id. at 13.
40. See id. at 2–3.
41. Id. at 13. The researchers offer an important caveat: this massive miscalculation is
likely a conservative estimate. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Al Shaw & Lylla Younes, The Most Detailed Map of Cancer-Causing Industrial Air
Pollution in the U.S., PROPUBLICA (Mar. 15, 2022), https://projects.propublica.org/toxmap
[perma.cc/ERF3-QGJ6].
44. Generally, facilities that attract mobile sources of pollution (but not federally assisted
highways or airports, which the EPA may regulate). See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5).
45. Id. § 7543(e)(1). State and local attempts to pass environmental regulations concerning locomotives are also sometimes frustrated by other areas of federal law. See, e.g., BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Clark Cnty., 11 F.4th 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding regulation preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act because it would burden railroad activity); Ass’n.
of Am. R.Rs. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 1033 (2021).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(A).
48. Kevin Downing, Robert McCullough & Eric Shierman, The Hidden Killer: Towards
Regulating Railyard Diesel Particulate Matter Emissions in Oregon, HATFIELD GRADUATE J. PUB.
AFFS., Aug. 2019, at 1, 12.
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remain underregulated until they are replaced or remanufactured. Individuals
located near diesel engines, like locomotives, are at substantial risk of exposure
to diesel particulate matter (DPM). 49 DPM contains a number of harmful metals and compounds, such as arsenic and lead, 50 and it is classified as a known
human carcinogen. 51 In Center for Community Action, California residents
sought to abate the harms caused by DPM emissions from railyards in their
community through a unique method: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) citizen suit provision. 52
The plaintiffs represented communities of individuals in the Riverside
and San Bernardino areas of southern California; one community in particular, the Westside of San Bernardino, has the highest cancer rate from railyard
pollution in the state (3,300 per million). 53 This community is largely made
up of poor individuals, including many Latino immigrants. 54
The RCRA citizen suit provision will be discussed in more detail, 55 but for
now, a brief primer—two kinds of individuals may be sued under the provision: “any person” or “the Administrator” of the EPA. 56 There are two provisions within the “any person” subsection—suits based on a violation of a
RCRA permit, standard, regulation, and the like, or suits under section
(a)(1)(B), which are not based on a RCRA violation, but commence against
anyone responsible for “solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 57 It is this
imminent and substantial endangerment provision that the plaintiffs in Center for Community Action used, and it is the focus of the proposals advocated
for in this Note.
The plaintiffs argued that the CAA gap discussed above provides inadequate regulation. 58 The two defendant companies owned sixteen railyards in

49. OSHA & MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DIESEL EXHAUST/DIESEL PARTICULATE
MATTER 1 (2013) [hereinafter OSHA, DIESEL EXHAUST], https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OSHA-3590.pdf [perma.cc/574X-KEHM].
50. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 25, Ctr. for
Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. Union Pac. Corp., No. CV 11-08608, 2012 WL 2086603 (C.D. Cal.
May 29, 2012).
51. OSHA, DIESEL EXHAUST, supra note 49, at 2.
52. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at paras. 35–41.
53. Id. at para. 10.
54. Id.
55. See infra Section III.A.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. Union Pac. Corp., No. CV 11-08608, 2012 WL
2086603, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) (“California cannot regulate locomotives, the primary
DPM sources in railyards; the EPA can regulate locomotives, but cannot regulate railyards because they are indirect sources of air pollution.”), aff’d sub nom. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t
Just. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
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California. 59 In 2005, the group of railyards emitted over 160 tons of diesel
particulate matter. 60 In an opinion by District Judge S. James Otero, 61 the court
denied the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the proposed application of RCRA
would conflict with the CAA and that DPM is not a “solid waste” within the
meaning of RCRA. 62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, though on different
grounds. 63
At the time of the suit, the defendants were proposing the construction of
a new railyard. 64 A recent article suggests that, despite initial hiccups, that project is moving forward. 65 Environmental analysis shows that the expected
emissions of DPM and other pollutants “would exceed state and federal standards in almost all versions of the project if it’s completed,” and the project will
be sited within communities of color in West Long Beach—where the average
life expectancy is seven years lower than other parts of the city—near schools,
parks, and residential areas. 66
These are not imaginary or de minimis harms. These gaps in the CAA put
millions of people at an unnecessarily increased risk of cancer and other health
problems. Communities closest to railyards where the effects of DPM are most
concentrated, often communities of color, suffer the most. This case highlights the necessity of providing people with a remedy when their lives and the
environment are put at substantial risk of harm due to statutory or regulatory
oversight. It is the result of an environmental policy that asks how much harm
is allowable rather than how little harm is possible.
B. Harms from Permitted Sources
Only major sources of air pollution and certain facilities require a Title V
operating permit under the CAA, 67 leaving a significant number of emissions
un- or underregulated. Despite their protective intent, permits often sanction
59. Id. at *1.
60. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at
para. 27.
61. Before joining the bench, Judge Otero served as regional counsel for the Southern
Pacific Transportation Company, a railroad. See Hon. James Otero (Ret.), LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/in/hon-james-otero-ret-a258031a7 [perma.cc/4S6U-8BTT].
62. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 2012 WL 2086603, at *6, *9.
63. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
64. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at
para. 4.
65. Jason Ruiz, New Environmental Analysis Revives Controversial Rail Yard Project,
LONG BEACH POST NEWS (June 29, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://lbpost.com/news/new-environmental-analysis-revives-controversial-rail-yard-project [perma.cc/3Y3H-XCC3].
66. Id.
67. Who Has to Obtain a Title V Permit?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/title-v-operatingpermits/who-has-obtain-title-v-permit [perma.cc/K7K9-BMDE] (last updated May 25, 2022).
Major sources are defined as those emitting more than 100 tons of any pollutant each year, 10
tons of one hazardous air pollutant, or 25 tons combined of multiple hazardous air pollutants.
Specified facilities include, for example, medical waste incinerators. Id.
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environmental harms by providing cover from liability. Title V permits can
create “permit shields,” which act as a defense against lawsuits. 68 If a defendant
possesses a permit with a permit shield provision, they cannot be the subject
of a citizen suit, so long as they are complying with the terms of the permit.69
Even where there is no permit shield, the only way to challenge the validity of
a permit is through the CAA’s judicial review provision rather than a citizen
suit. 70
In Little v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., for example, the defendant operated a power plant that emitted coal ash and dust onto the plaintiffs’ properties. 71 Residents in the area described the emissions from the 1950s-era plant
as “pounds upon pounds of ash blowing in your face.” 72 This dust and ash
were not just annoying but dangerous. 73 Children exposed to coal ash suffer
gastrointestinal complications at a rate six times higher than average, ADHD
at rates three-and-a-half times greater than average, and are more likely to
experience trouble sleeping. 74 People near the power plant learned to keep
their kids inside and their doors and windows shut. 75
The Louisville residents raised CAA and RCRA claims, which the defendant power plant moved to dismiss. The court dismissed most of the CAA
claims and agreed that the challenged emissions were authorized and therefore not subject to a RCRA citizen suit. 76 The coal plant was eventually replaced with a natural gas plant, reducing some emissions, 77 but not before a

68. Eugene E. Dice, Cracks in EPA Permit Shields? Circuits Will Assess Damage, LAW360
(June 4, 2014, 4:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/544187/cracks-in-epa-permit-shieldscircuits-will-assess-damage [perma.cc/MK6W-D59Z].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 33 F. Supp. 3d 791, 796 (W.D. Ky. 2014), aff’d, 805 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2015).
72. James Bruggers, Sixty Years of Coal Burning Ends at LG&E Plant, COURIER J. (July 7,
2015, 3:16 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/tech/science/environment/2015/07/06/
lge-ku-energy-dedicates-new-natural-gas-power-plant-cane-run-property/29762011 [perma.cc
/FV4G-WMNS].
73. The plaintiffs argued that the dust and ash contained arsenic, silica, lead, and chromium. Little, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 796. Fine particulate matter like soot has also been shown to have
a harmful impact on endangered species and their habitats. Press Release, Lawsuit Filed to Protect
Endangered Wildlife, Plants from Dangerous Soot, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-releases/lawsuit-filed-to-protect-endangered-wildlife-plants-from-dangerous-soot-2021-02-09 [perma.cc/EB7L-7YDU].
74. Ryan Van Velzer, After Years of Coal Ash Exposure, Scientists Assess Health of Cane Run
Neighbors, WFPL (July 24, 2018), https://wfpl.org/after-years-of-coal-ash-exposure-scientists-assess-health-of-cane-run-neighbors [perma.cc/5XDE-PQWC].
75. Id.
76. Little, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 796–807, 812–14.
77. Bruggers, supra note 72.
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substantial amount of harm had already been done. In a recent study, 85 percent of Louisville parents near coal plants reported that their children suffered
health issues, such as respiratory or behavioral disorders. 78
For children in Louisville who live with chronic respiratory, behavioral,
and other health issues caused by the Louisville plants, it seems almost impossible to say that the toxic ash, which covered the yards where they played and
the streets on which they walked to school, did not present an “imminent and
substantial endangerment” to their health. 79 Yet they were not able to get relief
in federal court because of the CAA’s permit scheme. This gap is one that
RCRA citizen suits could remedy, and in so doing, push for environmental
policies that promote a precautionary principle of harm elimination.
III. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
RCRA emerged from tragedies like that at Love Canal, which involved the
disposal of toxic waste under homes and a school, causing birth defects and
cancer, and literally burning the hands of children who played there. 80 RCRA’s
stated policy is that “wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste
[should] be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible.” 81 Additionally, waste “should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment.” 82
A. The Unique Citizen Suit Provision
Citizen suits are arguably “the engine that propels the field of environmental law.” 83 From 1993 to 2002, roughly 75 percent of all civil environmental cases were citizen suits. 84 RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972,
allows for two kinds of suits against another person: (a)(1)(A) suits, which

78. Kristina M. Zierold & Clara G. Sears, Community Views About the Health and Exposure of Children Living Near a Coal Ash Storage Site, 40 J. CMTY. HEALTH 357 (2015); see also
James Bruggers, U of L Studies How Coal Ash Affects Kids’ Health, COURIER J. (Apr. 18, 2017,
11:00 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/tech/science/environment/2017/04/17/u-lstudies-how-coal-ash-affects-kids-health/100568932 [perma.cc/MJP8-5Y4S]. Coal plants also
emit more mercury than any other nonnatural source, and exposure to mercury during pregnancy is linked to neurological abnormalities. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 768 (2015) (Kagan,
J., dissenting); see also Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 5-4 POD, at 19:39 (Nov. 16,
2021), https://www.fivefourpod.com/episodes/michigan-v-environmental-protection-agency
[perma.cc/CDJ2-7S64] (“Mercury is so dangerous that you’re not even supposed to eat like two
cans of tuna at once. . . . And these places are just pumping it into the air.”).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
80. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/
love-canal-tragedy.html [perma.cc/6VR5-LC29] (last updated Sept. 22, 2016).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b).
82. Id.
83. James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
84. Id. at 8.
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require a violation of a RCRA “permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order,” and (a)(1)(B) suits, which may commence
against “any person . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 85 A plain reading of the statute
makes clear that (a)(1)(B) suits (imminent and substantial endangerment, or
“ISE” suits) are broader in scope, as they do not require any specific violation
of the Act. The ISE provision is “ ‘essentially a codification of the common law
public nuisance’ and is intended to be construed ‘more liberal[ly] than [its]
common law counterparts.’ ” 86 This sentiment—that the ISE provision should
be construed broadly—has been echoed in multiple circuits. 87 Within the citizen suit provision, the term “solid waste” takes on a broader meaning than it
does when that term is used in other parts of the statute. 88
Understanding the uniqueness of the ISE citizen suit underscores why it
can and should be applied more broadly. Section (a)(1)(A)’s focus on violations under RCRA untethers (a)(1)(B) from the rest of the statutory scheme
because reading (a)(1)(B) to apply only to RCRA violations would render that
portion of the statute duplicative. Instead, (a)(1)(B) must be understood as a
freestanding suit provision, bound to RCRA only in the sense that it is concerned with RCRA’s definitions of solid or hazardous waste. It is also closer to
the precautionary principle of harm elimination than other environmental
statutes’ citizen suit provisions, asking whether harm is imminent and substantial rather than merely permitted by statute. 89 This difference has already
proven useful in covering gaps in other statutory schemes, such as those in the
Clean Water Act (CWA).

85. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1).
86. Fresh Air for the Eastside, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. of N.Y., L.L.C., 405 F. Supp. 3d 408,
434–45 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
87. E.g., Me. People’s All. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 297 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e
perceive a congressional thumb on the scale in favor of remediation.”); United States v. Waste
Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[The imminent and substantial endangerment
provision] is a congressional mandate that the former common law of nuisance, as applied to
situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous wastes exists, shall include new terms
and concepts which shall be developed in a liberal, not a restrictive, manner.”); United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982) (“By enacting the endangerment provisions of
RCRA . . . Congress sought to invoke the broad and flexible equity powers of the federal courts
in instances where hazardous wastes threatened human health.” (citation omitted)); AM Int’l,
Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing how the (a)(1)(B) ISE
provision permits a broader range of suits than its (a)(1)(A) counterpart).
88. Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1993).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (requiring a violation of an effluent standard or limitation
or an order from the Administrator relating to such standard or limitation); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1) (requiring a violation of an emissions standard or limitation, or an Administrator
or State order relating to such standard or limitation); id. § 7604(a)(3) (allowing suits against
new facilities only where there were certain prior Act violations).
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B. RCRA Citizen Suits as a Gap-Filler in the Clean Water Act
RCRA’s ISE citizen suit provision has already been applied outside the
context of RCRA itself to include water pollution. In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms, a gun club had allowed its 40,000 annual
patrons to shoot guns over the waters of the Long Island Sound for decades. 90
Close to five million pounds of lead shot and eleven million pounds of clay
target fragments polluted the water and surrounding land. 91 Plaintiffs sued
under both the CWA and RCRA. Because the gun club had already ceased
operation, the court dismissed the CWA claims because of a failure to allege
an “ongoing violation” as required by precedent. 92
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiffs’ remaining RCRA
claim by noting the distinction between section 6972(a)(1)(A) (which invokes
a narrow regulatory-focused definition of solid waste) and section
6972(a)(1)(B) (which invokes the broader statutory definition). 93 Solid waste
is defined by the statute as “any garbage, refuse . . . and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities.” 94
Consistent with other courts, 95 the Second Circuit found that material is
“discarded” when it is left to accumulate after serving its intended purpose. 96
The court therefore concluded that under this broad statutory definition, lead
shot and clay targets were solid wastes. 97 As such, the plaintiffs’ RCRA citizen
suit did not fall prey to the same gap that their CWA citizen suit did because
“under an imminent hazard citizen suit, the endangerment must be ongoing,
but the conduct that created the endangerment need not be.” 98 In other words,
citizen suits under RCRA may commence even if the disposal is wholly past,99
so long as the dangerous potential of that disposal is lingering. The ongoing
violation requirement of the CWA can be seen as a gap in the law. In this case,
were it not for RCRA, the requirement of an ongoing violation would result
in allowing millions of pounds of toxic lead to sit in the waters of the Long
Island Sound, causing needless harm for decades to come. Fortunately, the
court did not let that happen.

90. 989 F.2d at 1308.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1310–12.
93. Id. at 1314–15.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
95. See, e.g., Charleston Waterkeeper v. Frontier Logistics, L.P., 488 F. Supp. 3d 240, 256
(D.S.C. 2020) (collecting cases from three other federal district courts).
96. Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. But cf. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
(holding that “wholly past” violations of the CWA are not subject to citizen suit).

338

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:325

Remington Arms is notable for what the Second Circuit did not do. The
court did not focus on the notion that ‘RCRA is about land, CWA is about
water.’ Instead, the court interpreted and applied the plain text of the statute.
The Second Circuit took the plaintiffs’ invitation to use the ISE provision to
remedy a gap, rather than leaving millions of pounds of lead at the bottom of
a lake to poison wildlife, swimmers, and (as sea levels rise) residents in the
surrounding area. This Note considers the extent to which RCRA’s statutory
definition of “solid waste” can be used to similarly extend the application of
the ISE provision to address particulate and gaseous matter pollutants.
C. RCRA and Gaseous Matter
First, it is important to note the distinction between particulate matter
and gas. Courts often fail to make this distinction at the outset, leading to substantial confusion. Particulate matter is not gas but instead is “fine solid particles suspended in a gas.” 100 Particulate matter can also be very small liquid
droplets suspended in a gas or the atmosphere. 101 Common causes of particulate matter include incomplete fossil fuel combustion and construction activity. 102 Once emitted into the troposphere, particles are removed through
rainfall or eventually stick to various surfaces (though some larger particles
reach the ground through the force of gravity). 103 This is to say that particulate
matter generally consists of solids and liquids suspended in gas, which is an
important distinction to make when considering how RCRA defines the term
“solid waste.”
When first enacted, RCRA did not regulate air emissions; however, it was
amended in 1984 to regulate air emissions at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 104 This was done in response to the EPA’s inaction
on regulating such facilities under the CAA, 105 providing some evidence that
RCRA is not only about solid waste on the ground but also about air emissions. Additionally, it provides evidence of Congress’s interest in using RCRA

100. DIPAK K. SARKAR, THERMAL POWER PLANT 479 (2015).
101. J.A. Geddes & J.G. Murphy, The Science of Smog: A Chemical Understanding of
Ground Level Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter, in METROPOLITAN SUSTAINABILITY 206 (Frank
Zeman, ed., 2012).
102. Id.
103. Geddes & Murphy, supra note 101, at 208. Admittedly, this analysis is complicated by
the fact that PM10 is generally emitted directly into the atmosphere, whereas PM2.5 is formed
from gas or interactions with other chemical compounds in the atmosphere. Id. at 213–14. This
makes it more difficult to tell if the particulate matter came directly from the smokestack or if it
began as a gas and later was converted into particulate matter. This problem will likely be solved
by using experts, who often are needed to argue substantial endangerment in the course of litigation. Or, it could be cured by implementing the legislative fix proposed infra in Section IV.B.
Such a distinction also might not be necessary in cases where people can see the particulate matter cloud touch down after emission. The point is that this is something litigators may have to
consider at the outset.
104. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
105. Id. at 1029.
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to fill the space where the CAA (or at least the EPA’s implementation of it)
has failed to regulate air emissions. Against the backdrop of this legislative
history and the distinction between particulate matter and gas, this Note considers how courts treat the two kinds of emissions in the RCRA context.
1.

Cases Concerning Particulate Matter

In Center for Community Action, the Ninth Circuit held that diesel particulate matter (DPM) was not a solid waste because the emission of DPM was
not a “disposal.” 106 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit did not address, but also
did not disturb, the lower court’s contention that DPM was not a solid
waste. 107
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reached a different result in a case concerning claims of C8 contamination of soil and
groundwater caused by DuPont. 108 In that case, DuPont did not contest that
it released C8 through air emissions and by dumping the chemical into a river
and at sites near their facility. 109 DuPont did, however, contest the ISE suit
under RCRA, arguing that air emissions from industrial stacks were not a disposal of solid waste. 110 The court considered the holding in Center for Community Action but declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow reading of
RCRA’s text and legislative history,” instead finding the aerial emissions of C8
that fell to the ground were a disposal of solid waste. 111 The DuPont court differentiated its holding from the Ninth Circuit’s, writing that “diesel particulate
matter fell onto the land, and then was swept back up into the air, causing
harm to those who inhaled it. In contrast, . . . solid C8 particles are emitted
into the air, fall onto the ground, remain there, and then contaminate the soil
and groundwater.”112 In essence, the court was more concerned with the destination of the pollutant than the source of emission—contamination of the
ground is different from contamination of the groundwater, at least according
to the district court.
Two other cases suggest that particulate matter is a solid waste that can be
the subject of a RCRA citizen suit. The first is McEvoy v. IEI Barges Services,

106. Id. at 1020–21.
107. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. Union Pac. Corp., No. CV 11-08608, 2012 WL
2086603 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2012).
108. Little Hocking Water Ass’n v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940,
947 (S.D. Ohio 2015). Similar litigation was recently featured in the film, Dark Waters, the documentary, The Devil We Know, and a Last Week Tonight episode with John Oliver. See DARK
WATERS (Focus Features 2019); THE DEVIL WE KNOW (Atlas Films 2018); LastWeekTonight,
PFAS: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2021), https://youtu.be/
9W74aeuqsiU.
109. Du Pont, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 947–48.
110. Id. at 962–63.
111. Id. at 965.
112. Id.
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which involved CAA, RCRA, and common law tort claims against the operator of a coal transfer and storage facility for coal dust that ended up on the
plaintiff’s property. 113 Notably, the defendant conceded that the coal dust was
a disposal of solid waste. 114 Ultimately, the plaintiff’s RCRA claim was rejected
by the court for lack of an imminent and substantial endangerment. 115 Had
that element been satisfied, the defendant’s concession that the dust was a
solid waste disposal likely would have enabled the plaintiff to use the RCRA
citizen suit provision to address a harm that the CAA could not. 116
In a second case, United States v. Power Engineering Co., 117 the Tenth Circuit accepted that a “mist” of hexavalent chromium could constitute a disposal
for RCRA purposes. 118 The court below described the mist as a “suspended
liquid” that came within RCRA’s definition of a “solid waste.” 119
The debate over particulate matter for RCRA suits remains an open question. While the Ninth Circuit strongly pushes one way, these other courts militate in the other direction, leaving the majority of circuits and districts
without an answer.
2.

Cases Concerning Gaseous Matter

Unlike particulate matter, whether gaseous matter is a “solid waste” is less
open for debate. Several courts have focused specifically on the inclusion of
“contained gaseous material” in the solid waste definition, 120 and even the
EPA has admitted that RCRA’s solid waste definition does not apply to uncontained gaseous material. 121 These cases generally point to the fact that
RCRA, as presently written, does not allow litigation to enjoin gaseous emissions. Therefore, a legislative change may be necessary to make such abatement possible.
The EPA has considered if it can regulate uncontained gases, and the conclusion has consistently been no. In 1989, the EPA stated, “the Agency now
believes that our authority under RCRA is limited to the regulation of only

113. No. 06 C 50080, 07 C 5007, 2009 WL 10700262, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2009).
114. McEvoy, 2009 WL 10700262, at *10.
115. Id. at *11.
116. See id. at *11, *15.
117. 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
118. Power Eng’g, 191 F.3d at 1231.
119. United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1158 (D. Colo. 1998). While
the case concerned a suit by the EPA, and not a citizen suit, see id. at 1146, its interpretation of
the statutory language is still relevant and persuasive here.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
121. See infra notes 122–124, 126 and accompanying text. There is one federal district
court case going the other way; however, its persuasive authority is undermined by the fact that
it did not consider the EPA’s statements on the issue, in addition to many courts coming out
differently.
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containerized or condensed gases.” 122 This was reiterated in 2014, when the
EPA considered whether supercritical fluids were “solid waste” within
RCRA’s definition. 123 The EPA noted that supercritical fluid was different
than contained gaseous material, which was specifically mentioned within the
statute. 124 While it is important to keep in mind that the statutory definition
of solid waste is broader than the regulatory definition, the fact that the EPA
has come to this conclusion is persuasive. In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. City
of Evanston, a city brought suit against two natural gas companies under
RCRA based on the allegation that their pipeline leak constituted an improper
disposal of “solid waste.”125 Among other things, the court noted that in a 2014
brief filed by the EPA before the D.C. Circuit, the agency acknowledged that
the specific inclusion of “contained” gases in the solid waste definition showed
a congressional intent to exclude uncontained gases—the interpretive canon
of expressio unius suggests that uncontained gases cannot be solid wastes. 126
Similarly, a different federal district court found that coke oven gas that
leaked from a pipe was “discarded,” however, it was not a solid waste because
the plain language of the statute excludes uncontained gases. 127 And the Fifth
Circuit also has a reported case where it assumed, as an initial matter, that in
order for a gas to be a “solid waste,” it must necessarily be “contained.” 128 The
main case cutting in the opposite direction is Citizens Against Pollution v.
Ohio Power. 129 The court stated that because the flue gas at issue was discarded, and solid waste includes “other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material,” the court therefore did not
need to consider what the gas was, because the list was illustrative, and the gas
was already determined to be discarded. 130 While this case is a strong assertion
of the argument that gases are solid wastes for the RCRA citizen suit provision,
it is undermined by the fact that it did not consider the EPA’s statements (and

122. Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste CERCLA Hazardous Substance Designation; Reportable Quantity Adjustment, 54 Fed.
Reg. 50968, 50970 (Dec. 11, 1989) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 261, 271, 302).
123. Hazardous Waste Management System: Conditional Exclusion for Carbon Dioxide
(CO2) Streams in Geological Sequestration Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 350, 354–55 (Jan. 3, 2014)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9. 260, 261).
124. Id. at 355.
125. 162 F. Supp. 3d 654, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
126. N. Ill. Gas Co., 162 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (citing Brief for Respondents at 21, 57–58, Carbon Sequestration Council v. EPA, 787 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1046), 2014 WL
5830427). The court in City of Evanston concluded that the methane leaking from the natural
gas pipeline was not a solid waste. Id. at 658–63.
127. Helter v. AK Steel Corp., No. C-1-96-527, 1997 WL 34703718, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
31, 1997).
128. United States v. Sims Bros. Constr., 277 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 6903(27)).
129. No. C2-04-CV-371, 2006 WL 6870564 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2006).
130. Citizens Against Pollution, 2006 WL 6870564, at *5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 6903(27)).
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it was decided years prior to some of the EPA’s statements, so it could not have
considered them), and it does not contemplate the expressio unius argument,
which in this context seems particularly strong—it would be odd for Congress
to have intended “all gases,” and then explicitly only state “contained gases”
in its list, no matter how illustrative the list was intended.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
From the discussion above, it seems that courts are, at the very least, hostile to treating gaseous emissions as “solid waste” for RCRA purposes. But in
most jurisdictions, particulate matter is still an open question subject to future
litigation. This Part discusses some possible arguments in favor of using
RCRA’s imminent and substantial endangerment (ISE) suits in litigation
against emissions of harmful particulate pollution and also proposes a legislative fix that could avoid the resulting incongruity from allowing only particulate matter to be the target of a RCRA suit. Before discussing these changes in
detail, it is important to address two questions: Why favor citizen suit litigation as opposed to a more regulatory approach? And why use the RCRA citizen suit provision when the CAA has its own citizen suit provision? Each of
these will be answered in turn.
First, it is necessary to discuss why a solution to some of the gaps in the
CAA should involve expanding citizen suits rather than changing the regulatory structure. For one, RCRA’s ISE provision is strong medicine: it provides
for retroactive liability, 131 as well as an award of attorney’s fees and costs. 132
Moreover, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts will sometimes
appoint a “Special Master” to oversee remediation and compliance at the cost
of the defendant. 133 While there can be no question that government regulation is an essential feature of environmental law, litigation has a unique way
of allowing communities and individuals, often those harmed most, to seek
justice beyond what a complex regulatory framework can deliver. 134
Environmental citizen suits disrupt the traditional model of the regulatory state, which treats regulation as a matter between the regulator and the
regulated entity, by introducing a third party that circumvents the problem of
“agency capture.” 135 Expansion of the citizen suit provision in RCRA is one
131. Petropoulos v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
132. See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796, 843 (D.N.J.
2003), aff’d, 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005).
133. See id. at 834 (appointing a Special Master in an ISE case where the defendant had
engaged in “regulatory ping-pong”).
134. See ODAY SALIM, GREAT LAKES ENV’T L. CTR., FLINT WATER CRISIS TESTIMONY
(2016), https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/mdcr/mcrc/testimony/salim-redacted.pdf [perma.cc/4QWA-3DLL] (“Without . . . citizen litigation tools, it is difficult to remedy past harms or future harms that will inevitably slip through the cracks of even an improved
pre-decision process.”).
135. See Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators: Four Cases Where Citizen
Suits Drove Development of Clean Water Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 61,
74–75 (2014). “Agency capture” describes the problem where agencies become controlled by the
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way of ensuring that environmental policy is community led. This concern is
also a good reason to favor citizen suits instead of suits by the EPA or some
other actor in the system. 136 A community that is currently experiencing harm
should be able to find a remedy, regardless of who occupies the White
House. 137 For example, in 2018, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler disbanded a panel of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee consisting of
experts in epidemiology, toxicology, medicine, and other fields. 138 This panel
traditionally reported findings to the EPA to help update air quality standards;
at the time they were disbanded, they were updating existing particulate pollution standards, which were found to be “not protective of public health.” 139
Expansion of the citizen suit provision is a simple judicial avenue that allows
communities to speak for themselves when harm occurs, rather than relying
on a complex regulatory framework that sits under the constant specter of deregulation. While simple solutions in all areas of environmental law may not
be appropriate to account for unique industries, pollutants, and harms, a simple solution in this circumstance is a reasonable way of preventing and remedying harms whenever and wherever they occur.
Second, assuming that expanding the avenues of litigation for communities is a better solution than expanding the regulatory reach of the government, it is worth asking: why focus on the RCRA citizen suit provision rather
than the CAA citizen suit provision? The simple answer is that the current
CAA citizen suit provision has no ISE provision. 140 In order to target particulate matter pollution that does not violate CAA standards or regulations, the
Act would need to be amended. The EPA has emergency power under the

industries they regulate because of their close associations and “revolving door” employment
relationships. See id. at 75; see also David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 MICH. L. REV.
753, 824 (2022) (“[D]elegating authority to agencies does not only create risks that they will exceed their statutory authority, . . . . [i]t also creates a risk that agencies will attempt to kill or nullify the very programs they administer.”).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
137. See Joseph Goffman & Laura Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump Administration’s Deregulatory Agenda, 70 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2020) (“The Trump EPA is working to change the Agency’s progressive trajectory through a series of rule rollbacks based on interpretations of the CAA that
narrow the Agency’s legal authority. The EPA is no longer conducting rigorous empirical analyses to understand and solve air-quality problems; instead, it is interpreting the CAA to establish
that it lacks the authority to act.”); see also Samantha Gross, What Is the Trump Administration’s
Track Record on the Environment?, BROOKINGS: POLICY 2020 (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-is-the-trump-administrations-track-record-on-the-environment [perma.cc/V74Z-L5V9].
138. H. Christopher Frey, The EPA Disbanded Our Clean Air Science Panel. We Met Anyway—and Found That Particle Pollution Regulations Aren’t Protecting Public Health,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 29, 2019, 8:58 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-epa-disbanded-ourclean-air-science-panel-we-met-anyway-and-found-that-particle-pollution-regulations-arentprotecting-public-health-125779 [perma.cc/3DW7-N52F].
139. Id.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
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CAA to bring suit and restrain air emissions that are “an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare, or the environment,” 141 but
this power is discretionary142 and therefore subject to agency capture. 143 The
RCRA citizen suit provision, as this Note argues, would not need to be
amended in order to target particulate matter.
This Note also proposes a legislative solution for the second problem:
nonsolid waste. So why only focus on RCRA here rather than the CAA citizen
suit provision? In some cases, the alleged endangerment might involve both
solid waste and gas. In the hexavalent chromium case discussed in Section
III.C, for example, the facility was discharging a contaminated mist, but its air
scrubbers were also leaking a “yellow/orange liquid” down the side of the
building into the soil below. 144 While the CAA defines air pollutants broadly,
one would be hard pressed to argue that liquid running down the side of the
building would be an air pollutant as defined by the Act, even if there were an
ISE provision that allowed suit when air pollutants were causing an endangerment. 145 This means that litigants would need to plead two kinds of claims in
mixed-matter cases; however, if RCRA is amended to include gaseous matter,
then only one claim need be pursued. It might be argued that the CAA could
borrow the definition of “solid waste” from RCRA and look to RCRA case
law 146 in adjudicating a new ISE provision in the CAA. But this feels unnecessary because RCRA already has an ISE provision that works, and a slight expansion could make it work even better. The following two sections describe
how the ISE citizen suit provision could work better—first, starting today,
with how litigants can argue that ISE applies to particulate matter, and then,
considering what Congress could do in the future to expand protection for
communities.
A. Attempting More ISE Suits in PM Cases
Communities that have been harmed by particulate matter pollution
should continue to bring (and bring more) ISE citizen suits. Most courts have
not resolved this issue, but there are strong textual, structural, historical, and

141. Id. § 7603.
142. Hassig v. EPA, No. 02-1001, 2002 WL 1364297, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2002); see 42
U.S.C. § 7603 (“[T]he Administrator . . . may bring suit on behalf of the United States . . . .”)
(emphasis added); id. § 7604(a) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil action . . . against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary . . . .”) (emphasis added).
143. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
144. United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d,
191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
146. Numerous federal courts have considered what constitutes imminent and substantial
endangerment under RCRA. See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1996);
Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2009); Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1022 (10th Cir. 2007).
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policy reasons to support the conclusion that emissions of particulate matter
are disposals of solid waste under the statute. 147 Textually, particulate matter
is a solid, and when it is released into the air with no intent of future use, that
is a disposal. Structurally, section 6972(a)(1)(B) must be read as distinct from
section 6972(a)(1)(A), particularly given the disjunctive “or” separating the
provisions. Historically, Congress has evidenced an interest in filling CAA
gaps using RCRA remedies (in the 1984 amendments). 148 And from a policy
perspective, there are many reasons to help communities take polluters into
court to prevent and remediate harm where those communities would otherwise be left without a remedy. 149 The only issue left is to build the precedent
that clearly establishes that ISE suits apply to particulate matter. In this venture, a lone panel of the Ninth Circuit should not pose an obstacle.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Center for Community Action, as well as the
holding of the court below, is wrong for three major reasons. First, the court
essentially held that ‘RCRA is land, CAA is air,’ and the two must never overlap. After considering the history of RCRA and the CAA, the court concluded:
“The statutory and legislative histories . . . make clear that RCRA, in light of
its purpose to reduce the volume of waste that ends up in our nation’s landfills,
governs ‘land disposal.’ ” 150 The court conspicuously never cites Remington
Arms, which held that the ISE provision can apply to water disposal, not just
land disposal, 151 and it brushes aside any instance in which RCRA has been
applied outside of the “land” context. The Ninth Circuit assumed that because
Congress chose not to regulate railyards under the CAA, it must therefore
have been thinking about RCRA at the same time. 152 This approach is contrary
to the plain wording of the statute, which says that “any person” can be sued,

147. See Anuj C. Desai, Text Is Not Enough, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (2022) (“[I]n difficult,
contested cases, statutory interpretation is unavoidably a multimodal enterprise that involves
consideration of, at least, text, semantic context, statutory purpose, history (statutory, legislative,
social, and political), social context, precedent, moral judgment, and consequentialist reasoning.”); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7–8 (1982) (discussing five general types
of constitutional argument).
148. See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
149. Clean air, for those only thinking from a cost perspective, is also generally well worth
it. Analysis of the CAA has shown that the benefits of clean air are thirty-two times the cost of
regulation, and annually the Act prevents up to 370,000 premature deaths and creates up to $3.8
trillion in net economic benefits. Simon Mui & Amanda Levin, Clearing the Air: The Benefits of
the Clean Air Act, NRDC (May 5, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/clean-air-acts-benefits-map [perma.cc/PZ9Z-JZ54].
150. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1029 (9th Cir.
2014).
151. Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1308–1309
(2d Cir. 1993).
152. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1029–30 (“[T]he emissions that Congress intended
to be governed by the newly enacted RCRA provision were also, at that time, governed by the
Clean Air Act. Defendants’ railyards, however, as indirect sources, fell outside the scope of the
Clean Air Act, and therefore must also be excluded from RCRA’s regulatory reach.”).
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not any person regulated elsewhere under this statute. 153 This is why the gun
club in Remington Arms, which was not regulated under RCRA, could be sued.
The touchstone is imminent and substantial endangerment, not whether the
party’s conduct is regulated by the statute—that is why (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B)
are separate provisions.
Second, the court concluded that emission of DPM is not a “disposal” in
the context of a RCRA citizen suit. 154 A “disposal” includes discharging, depositing, injecting, dumping, spilling, leaking, and placing; from this, the
court remarks, “We note first that RCRA’s definition of ‘disposal’ does not
include the act of ‘emitting.’ ” 155 The court, again rather conspicuously, never
cites the definitions of any of the words in the statute. 156 For example, one of
the words in the list, discharge, has the following possible definition: “give
outlet or vent to,” or “emit,” as in “vehicles discharging exhaust fumes.” 157
Emit—the word the court felt would be necessary in order to make a finding
of a disposal—means “to throw or give off or out” and includes the listed synonym: “discharge.” 158 Or consider another word on the list, “leak,” which
means “to enter or escape through an opening usually by a fault or mistake”
(as in, “fumes leak in”). 159 If a filter could limit the discharge of DPM from
older locomotives, but the filter broke and some of the DPM slipped
through—or as some might say, “leaked”— should that really change the analysis of the court here? Is a mens rea required in order for something to be a
leak versus a mere emission? The interpretation of the statute in this portion
of the opinion is remarkably strained. 160 The word disposal should take on its
plain and ordinary meaning—discarded, that is, the “grave” part of “cradleto-grave,” 161 regardless of if that grave is in the soil, the bottom of a lake, or
the sky.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
154. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1025–26.
155. Id. at 1024.
156. Cf. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994) (stating that where a
word is not defined by statute, courts should construe the term to its ordinary and natural meaning).
157. Discharge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discharge [perma.cc/9HTS-X58Q]; see also Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1996)
(using Webster’s Dictionary to understand and define the term “imminent” in the RCRA citizen
suit provision).
158. Emit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emit
[perma.cc/2VXY-5ZQL].
159. Leak, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/leak
[perma.cc/6JYT-9FVY].
160. See also Recent Case, Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF
Railway Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1276 (2015) (“Future courts
should avoid the negative consequences of the [Ninth Circuit’s] bright-line order-of-disposal
rule by relying on an individualized inquiry into the nature of each alleged disposal.”).
161. “Cradle-to-grave” is a frequently used term to describe the aims of the RCRA statute.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Env’t Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994); Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950
F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Third, and finally, while the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the lower
court’s finding that DPM was not a “solid waste,” it did not disturb this holding either. 162 It is important to understand why the lower court was wrong in
reaching such an outcome. The lower court, at the motion to dismiss stage,
claimed that “[u]nder [p]laintiffs’ proposed definition of solid waste, any gas
containing compounds, regardless of size, that can be aggregated to form a
solid or liquid substance would qualify as a solid waste under RCRA,” and the
court continued to treat particulate matter as though it were a gas. 163 This evidences a tenuous grasp on the underlying science, and it is notable that the
court never cites any scientific treatises or textbooks for its plain and sweeping
conclusion that all particulate matter must be gas because it floats in gas. Even
from a legal perspective, this is wrong. Many state statutory and administrative codes start with the proposition that particulate matter is a liquid or a
solid—not a gas. 164 This is also how the EPA defines particulate matter.165 And
states, as well as the EPA, have developed methods to determine the difference
between particulate matter and gaseous material. 166
If the arguments above are not convincing enough to reject the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, consider one more question: what is the difference between coal ash blown off of a dump by the wind and coal ash emanating from
a smokestack? In Citizens Coal Council, for example, the defendants owned a
coal ash pile that would frequently blow ash into nearby streams and onto cars
and houses, 167 and the court concluded that this was solid waste subject to an
ISE suit. 168 The plaintiffs in Center for Community Action made a similar argument: why would a leak of toxic sludge be a disposal, but not so if a worker

162. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1030 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2014).
163. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. Union Pac. Corp., No. CV 11-08608, 2012 WL
2086603, at *7–9 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2012).
164. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.5525(f) (LexisNexis 2014) (“ ‘Particulate’ means
any air contaminant existing as a finely divided liquid or solid . . . .”); 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-1020 (2017) (“ ‘Particulate matter’ means any airborne finely divided solid or liquid material with
an aerodynamic diameter smaller than 100 micrometers.”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-1741(88) (2021) (“ ‘Particulate matter’ or ‘PM’ means any material, except water in uncombined
form that is or has been airborne and exists as a liquid or a solid in the ambient air.”); 020-00021 WYO. CODE R. § 3(a) (LexisNexis 2013) (“ ‘Particulate matter’ shall mean any airborne finely
divided solid or liquid material with an aerodynamic diameter smaller than 100 micrometers.”);
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 445B.129 (2018) (“ ‘Particulate matter’ means any material except uncombined water that exists in a finely divided form as a liquid or solid at reference conditions.”).
165. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, App. A-1; MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 336.2004(5) (2009) (listing
five tests for determining particulate emissions rates); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 212.110 (1996)
(deferring to the federal regulations for measurement tests).
167. Citizens Coal Council v. Matt Canestrale Contracting, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 593, 598–
99, 611 (W.D. Pa. 2014).
168. Id. at 611.
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uses a shovel to fling the sludge over their fence? 169 Much like in DuPont,
where the court understood that groundwater contamination caused by air
emissions versus dumping was “a distinction without a difference,” 170 the distinction between particle emissions into the air and particle movement from
one location to another seems similarly irrelevant. Twisting the language of
the ISE provision to help polluters escape liability is an unsustainable and unprincipled venture.
The DuPont court distinguished its holding from that of the Ninth Circuit
in Center for Community Action because DPM “fell onto the land, and then
was swept back up into the air, causing harm to those who inhaled it. In contrast, . . . solid C8 particles are emitted into the air, fall onto the ground, remain there, and then contaminate the soil and groundwater.” 171 Courts need
not think so narrowly. The statutory definition of “disposal” includes placing
solid waste “on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste
or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the
air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 172 To the DuPont
court’s credit, “disposal” does include placing waste into groundwater—directly relevant to C8—but it also includes placing waste where it will enter the
environment or be emitted into the air. This Note agrees with the DuPont
court insofar as it was willing to recognize that aerial emissions of pollutants
can be the subject of RCRA suits. However, this Note goes one step further to
argue that DPM and other pollutants that fall to the ground and are swept
back into the air “enter the environment,” as courts have broadly interpreted
that phrase. 173 From 1967 to 2012, toxic coal ash caused $2.3 billion in damage
to fish and wildlife. 174 If particulate matter is not entering the environment,
then what is it doing?
The remedies in these kinds of cases will often be very reasonable. On
construction sites, it is possible to limit the DPM emissions by limiting unnecessary idling of diesel engines or restricting the amount of diesel-powered
169. See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5–6, Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Env’t Just. v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), 2013 WL 663903.
170. Little Hocking Water Ass’n v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940,
947 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (footnote omitted).
171. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
173. See Voggenthaler v. Md. Square LLC, 724 F.3d 1050, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because
the phrase ‘enter the environment’ is qualified by the word ‘may’ in the definition of ‘disposal,’
the statute cannot be interpreted to cover only spills that go directly and immediately into the
groundwater. The statute contemplates that some spills may never enter the environment.”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3))); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL
550128 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996) (finding that where a substance was discovered in the soil, it
had entered the environment); cf. 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that asbestos, even when it becomes friable, does not “enter the
environment” because it remains contained within the building).
174. A. Dennis Lemly & Joseph P. Skorupa, Wildlife and the Coal Waste Policy Debate:
Proposed Rules for Coal Waste Disposal Ignore Lessons from 45 Years of Wildlife Poisoning, 46
ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 8595 (2012).
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equipment in a given area. 175 Another easy solution: consider environmental
justice when deciding where railyards will be built. 176 In recent years, new railyards (a significant source of particulate matter pollution) 177 have been proposed, constructed, or expanded in the Englewood neighborhood of Chicago,
near an elementary school in Alabama, and in a residential community in Baltimore. 178 It does not have to be this way. Communities should have a way to
protect themselves when particle pollution is not above the regulatory limit
but bad enough to cause cancer and cut lives short.
Litigants should continue to bring and test these kinds of claims. So far,
very few cases have been brought under the RCRA citizen suit provision, and
an overwhelming majority of circuit and district courts have not yet had the
chance to weigh in. Applying the RCRA citizen suit in this way would fix major problems with the CAA, avoid complex regulatory solutions, and promote
a precautionary principle of harm elimination that seeks to prevent imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
B. Amending the RCRA Citizen Suit Provision
From the discussion above of the CAA gaps, and application of RCRA to
gaseous matter, two things are certain: (1) courts may hesitate to apply the
RCRA citizen suit to gaseous material under existing law, and (2) the Title V
permit shields still sanction a significant amount of harm. Litigation alone
cannot solve these problems, but they could be resolved by changes to the
RCRA citizen suit provision. The following changes to subsection (a)(1)(B) of
RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, would address both of these
concerns:
against any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past
or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility, regardless of possession of a permit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7661 et seq., who has contributed or who is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid, uncontained gaseous, or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment . . .

The first change highlighted above specifically denies a defense on the basis of a permit shield under the relevant CAA provision. The second change is
an intentional rebuke to the expressio unius argument accepted by some

175. OSHA, DIESEL EXHAUST, supra note 49, at 2.
176. Andrea Hricko et al., Global Trade, Local Impacts: Lessons from California on Health
Impacts and Environmental Justice Concerns for Residents Living near Freight Rail Yards, 11
INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 1914, 1934 (2014).
177. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
178. Hricko, supra note 176, at 1931.
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courts. 179 While the definition of solid waste in RCRA would only include contained gases, 180 the revised ISE provision would make clear that “contained”
is no longer a limit on harmful gaseous emissions. At the same time, this proposal does not amend the definition of solid waste to avoid upsetting the rest
of the statutory and regulatory structure that relies on that definition. 181
This proposal would both care for the fact that gaseous pollution harms
communities just as much as particulate matter and would also prevent harm
from air pollution facilities regardless of their permitting status. There is one
notable drawback to this change: pollution emitters could always obtain
RCRA permits, which would be immune from the citizen suit provision. 182
The RCRA permit shield has been interpreted broadly by federal courts, and
attempts to use the RCRA citizen suit provision are generally considered improper collateral attacks on permitting decisions. 183 The natural response to
this would be to amend the law so that the RCRA permit shield does not pose
a bar to a citizen suit. But this approach would create an exception that could
swallow the rule. There would be a dramatic disincentive for those disposing
of solid waste to work outside the confines of RCRA’s regulatory structure, as
they would know that they would be subject to citizen suit regardless of if they
obtained a permit or not, provided they were causing an imminent and substantial endangerment. While RCRA permits will not be perfect, they will provide an added layer of protection beyond the Title V permits already required
under the CAA. 184 Therefore, this Note suggests the more modest approach,
allowing RCRA citizen suits to only circumvent CAA permit shields. Certainly, polluters would need to ask, “is what is coming out of our smokestack
going to cause an imminent and substantial harm to the surrounding community?” But the fact that they were not asking that question before is not a
compelling reason to avoid implementing this change. Decades of apathy
should not justify continuing harm.
Absent a legislative fix, something of an additional gap would be created—where plaintiffs could bring RCRA citizen suits against the railyard or
coal power plant, but not the methane emitting natural gas facility across the
street. Adding a few words to the statute would give people the chance to reduce harmful air pollution through litigation without imposing additional
regulatory requirements that will often allow some harms to slip through the
cracks.

179. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
181. See, e.g., id. § 7546(a)(1); 49 U.S.C. § 60128(b); 33 C.F.R. § 151.1006(4).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 6976.
183. See, e.g., Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178–82 (6th Cir.
1993).
184. And, it should be noted, getting a RCRA permit is not exactly easy. See id. at 1179
(“[T]he RCRA permitting process looks something like the organizational chart of the Prussian
army, with no less than twenty-six notable loci of decision.” (citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
This Note presents two possible solutions to tackle the problem of harmful particulate air pollution—one through litigation, which is rarely attempted
in the federal courts and notably absent from legal literature, and the other
through legislative amendment.
While using a statute that was written against the backdrop of hazardous
land waste to regulate pollutants in the air is unconventional, it is reasonable
in light of the text, history, structure, and policy of the law. Some might argue
that this approach will clog the courts and provoke costly litigation. This may
be true, to some extent, as the expansion of any private right of action will
likely expand the number of people who will invoke that right. The required
analysis, however, is one of competing harms.
Spikes in cancer, respiratory illness, childhood asthma, and any number
of other health harms (to say nothing of ecological harms) are not worth the
marginal benefit of keeping a few more cases out of the court system. If we
want a national environmental policy that works for all people, including
communities of color and poor communities, then we must recognize that
expanding access to the courts for people to bring claims, enjoin polluters, and
prevent substantial harm to their neighborhoods is necessary. Expanding the
scope of the RCRA citizen suit provision is not the only way to do that, but it
is certainly one worth considering.

